

Reminding, Letting Be, Showdoing

the organisation of psychotherapy

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Re-Minding, Letting Be, Showdoing: The Organisation of Psychotherapy

1

In this paper I want to air my scepticism about analytical psychology as a profession.

So that my argument can stand on its own feet, let me begin by saying where it comes from. First, from my interest in theatre, which began with my Diploma thesis in Zurich in 1965-6, on *Persona* and *Actor*. Theatre has given me an interest in performance which I don't find catered for within analytical psychology. Second, from my experience at the Westminster Pastoral Foundation between 1971 and 1982. The seemingly irresistible takeover of the pastoral by the analytic started me wondering what kind of historical moment and sociological process I was caught in. Third, work with people employed by the National Health Service. There is a problem about the relation between physical and behavioural approaches to psychotherapy, and transference centred interpersonal approaches, with which it seems to be impossible to get to grips. There are times when the ex newspaper man in me finds this a public scandal. Untended, this problem can become institutionalised in ways which prevent dialogue. I want the freedom and energy to address myself to this.

Experience within the Jungian community in England has certainly contributed to my present position. I have talked about this at the Jung Club (Holt, -1986). But I don't think I am denying its importance when I say that it has been secondary to more general pressures on me, pressures deriving from times in my life, both past and future, which aren't in any particular way Jungian.

2

Thinking about how I would like to see psychotherapy organised and taught I have come to identify three movements or modalities. I think of these as movements of the mind and heart and intellect which are both spiritual and technical. I call them the re-minding, the letting be, and the showdoing. I believe that psychotherapy should be so organised and taught as to allow for the fullest possible exchange between these three modalities.

Re-minding is of two kinds. One is about memory, the recall of times past. The other is associative, it makes comparisons, it employs our human sense for likeness. How these two kinds of re-minding are related is a question about which we are very confused. The psychology of the unconscious has led us to experiment with the therapeutic effects of combining them, so that memory is enriched by metaphor, and our powers of mental comparison and association are energised by story. Much remains to be done to clarify what happens when we encourage combination of this kind.

Letting be is about enjoyment and suffering. It can be active as well as passive. It can sound with the deep affirmation of a religious Amen, and with the bitter note of querulous self-pity. Letting be takes things as they are. It draws on connections between habit and spontaneity, freedom and inevitability. It accommodates boredom. It is about courage, staying power, endurance. But such endurance can allow us to recognize, for the first time, that things are indeed as they are. This links it to re-minding.

Showdoing moves, as its awkward name implies, between two verbs, to show and to do. Show me what to do. Show me how to do it. Here, let me show you. Showdoing is bringing up children, education, apprenticeship. It thrives on demonstration. It is the properly human power that energises the behavioural sciences.

In trying to spell out the connections between these three movements of technique and spirit and what I have learned from Jung, the first step has to be to drop the term analytical psychology. In its place I shall use the expression (psycho)analysis.

The name analytical psychology had its historical purpose, clearly to differentiate Jung's work from that of Freud, while allowing resonance with their community of interest. But if the organisation and teaching of psychotherapy is to encourage the fullest possible exchange between re-minding, letting be and showdoing, we need to be able to talk easily of the Freudian and Jungian traditions together, while continuing to own their historical differences and their abiding need on occasion to bracket each other out.

Jungians have tried to use the words analyst and analysis on their own to carry their sense of professional identity. There are times when I use them of myself. Perhaps we are now stuck with them. If so, it is a pity. Because they are wrong. They obscure those influences in his work which led Jung to prefer the term *Komplexe Psychologie*. They evade the question of what it is that we analyse. And in doing so, they cut corners and suggest too easy an accommodation between shamanism and accuracy.

The expression (psycho)analysis is awkward. But in being so it re-minds of awkward facts, and might make it both easier and more profitable for us 'to wash our dirty linen in public'. (Psycho)analysis reminds us constantly of the Freud Jung split. We need this reminder if we are to profit from the energies released by their quarrel. Freud and Jung are finding their respective places in history. Ignorance of Jung in the Freudian tradition continues to be surprising if not scandalous. We need places where the study of Jung is encouraged and furthered. (I am struck by the way I have returned to the close study of Jung's books since publicly distancing myself from his profession.) But in teaching psychotherapy, in training psychotherapists, we have to be reaching out for a language that can comprehend both traditions without denying the reasons for their falling apart and the many ways in which we have benefited from the consequences of that parting.

(I don't think I am saying anything particularly new here. My Zurich training in 1961-6 included extensive study of Freud. Most contemporary practice and writing in analytical psychology assumes the need for sustained interest in the work of Freud and his successors. What I am saying is that it would stimulate more searching study of Jung's books, and more fruitful debate with other traditions, if what we called ourselves made it clear that this is what we are up to.)

3

We use re-minding constantly. 'Does it remind you of anything?' 'What does it remind you of?' Re-minding is how we explore, probe, cast about for a scent, amplify, call up a context. What is peculiar to (psycho)analysis is the emphasis placed on the concept of the unconscious in trying to explain what happens when we are re-minded of. Although there are different theories of the unconscious, they all have in common an extensive use of vocabularies of knowing and awareness, unknowing and unawareness. If we submit to them we become immersed in a language world in which mind is assumed to be about knowing and unknowing, awareness and unawareness. Other views of mind are blanketed out.

There is a perhaps rather old fashioned English expression: 'that puts me in mind of'. People do sometimes use it instead of 'that reminds me of'. It is worth thinking about: the verb to put, me as object of an action, and mind as both a place and an attribute, the 'what' in which I am put is 'of' something else. We have here the intentional or object-relatedness character of our mindedness.

Is this kind of mindedness best thought of in terms of consciousness and unconsciousness, or is it better thought of in terms of being and doing? How does mind as a 'knowing of' relate to mind as a 'showing up', an 'acting on', a 'doing to'?

We can approach the question through 'interpretation'. Problems of interpretation figure prominently in the history and current state of (psycho)analysis. They move between what I am calling the three modalities of re-minding, letting be, showdoing.

(Psycho)analytic interpretations make extensive use of sign, symbol, metaphor. Some of our most deeply felt and enduring separations have been occasioned and sustained by differences in understanding how one thing can be 'like' another. There seems to be a need for fairly small groups sharing agreed assumptions as to the nature of metaphor, who can work intimately with each other in scrutinising the use of likeness, and in developing a teachable approach to how to use similarity, resemblance, representation, to effect psychological change. There is also need for these groups to be able to converse together. When this is successful, it is because we are able to suspend belief in our acquired metaphoric habitat and to entertain the possibility of other ways of experiencing and applying likeness. We move from a first degree intimacy with the uses and abuses of symbol to a more suspended state of metaphoric animation within which it may be possible to compare what works for us with what works for others without agreeing with them.

(It sometimes seems as if it is impossible to sustain such a state of suspension without losing our ability to make metaphor work in our clinical practice. There are case discussions which can be physiologically deeply disturbing, as well as perhaps in some unacknowledged way exciting, but which can make it very difficult to go back into our practice the next day.)

But (psycho)analysis also uses interpretation in situations of what we call transference and countertransference. I think the organisation of psychotherapy would be improved if we learned to study transference and countertransference in terms of what I am calling showdoing. This is already happening through the influence of group work and family systems work on (psycho)analytic satisfaction with traditional approaches to one to one work. Listening to some of the more relaxed, off the record, exchanges between (psycho)analysts when they meet in a shared interest in theatre I hear talk of transference and countertransference which seems to me to herald a root and branch revisioning of (psycho)analysis as we know it.

The distinction between showdoing and re-minding in our approach to transference can be approached through secret. For re-minding, secret is something to be got at. If I am 'to be put in mind of' a secret there are codes to be broken, clues to be solved, pretences to be seen through, riddles to be guessed, censors to be outwitted. Working with a secret is a progression from the known to the unknown, so that what is unseen becomes seen, what is unspoken is said.

Within the showdoing modality, secret is in play between the two verbs. We apprentice ourselves to learn the secrets (or mystery) of a craft or trade. We apply for the master class to learn the secrets of performance. We are accepted for the class if we are judged to have what it takes, to be able to use what is going to be shown to us. The secret is 'for showing'. What makes it inaccessible is the way it is lodged between a showing and a doing. There is a 'show me what to do' and there is a 'show me how to do it' to which all education is a response. The secrets of adaptation, of learning, of skill, of culture, are lodged between the show me what and the show me how. That lodgement is got at in doing.

What (psycho)analysis sometimes seems to be trying to do is to persuade us that this showing and this doing can, and indeed should, be defined in terms of knowing. The power of (psycho)analytic discourse, its attraction, its fascination, its outreach and its inscape, its ability to convert and to make what began as a method into a way of life, these are all generated between words of knowing and unknowing. A language of consciousness and unconsciousness turns with missionary and colonising zeal on all human life as its domain. Showing and doing are translated into problems of knowing and unknowing, and secrets which could be dealt with simply if showdoing were allowed its proper function become the stuff out of which strange, expensive and sometimes exhausting tapestries are spun. As a cultural phenomenon it is amazing. I doubt if from within it we can even begin to imagine the aberration we may be caught in.

Or perhaps we are beginning to. Take the last two paragraphs of the Laplanche-Pontalis discussion of 'Acting out'.

"One of the outstanding tasks of psycho-analysis is to ground the distinction between transference and acting out on criteria other than purely technical ones - or even mere consideration of locale (does something happen within the consulting room or not?). This task presupposes a reformulation of the concepts of action and actualisation and a fresh definition of the different modalities of communication.

Only when the relations between acting out and the analytic transference have been theoretically clarified will it be possible to see whether the structures thus exposed can be extrapolated from the frame of reference of the treatment - to decide, in other words, whether light can be shed on the impulsive acts of everyday life by linking them to relationships of the transference type."

To clarify the relations between acting out and the analytic transference we are going to have to demote our words of knowing and unknowing and allow the verbs to show and to do more power and more room. What we expect of interpretation has to be able to allow for the different modalities of imaginal likeness and physical representation. Criteria on which the distinction between transference and acting out can be grounded will have to take into account what theorists of the theatre call 'deixis', the energy released when persons and objects on a stage point at themselves. Deixis is what energises theatrical presentation. But it also energises all behaviour-in-a-context. It is not something to be got at by interpretation of an imaginative, reflective kind. The interpretation it calls for is, quite simply, performance. (Holt, 1987).

Sometimes it seems as if (psycho)analysis just forgot this. It is as if somewhere along the way we met with someone who persuaded us that the secret of the performance was to be found in knowing what to do and we could dispense with any showing. So for many years we went in search of that secret in lands where the only performance of interest took place between our knowing and our unknowing. Then we remembered something called object relations, and suddenly counter-transference was as, if not more, interesting than transference. Showing is become important again. Behaviour can point to secrets more economically than reflection, meditation or exegesis. How to energise that pointing is an important question for psychotherapy. We'd learn more about it if transference work and behavioural studies could find ways of talking to each other.

The energy of such pointing is close to what I mean by letting be. Performance is active, demonstrative, interpretive. Its interpretations - in the theatre, in the concert hall, in the workshop - are always open to another go. There is always room for another try. But they are nevertheless complete in themselves. They stand or fall on what is shown in the doing, done in the showing. There is a concentration of effort that is content to let its case rest.

This ability of performance to let its case rest is something we are going to have to think about if the behavioural and interpretive sciences are to learn from each other. What does it tell us about the relation between action, interpretation, and being-minded-of? The answers I work with have to do with letting be.

Like showdoing, letting be moves between two verbs, to let and to be. It is about permission, both in the sense of making possible and of leaving alone. And it is about what there is simply no other word for than Being.

Aristotle called it 'that which is'. Wittgenstein pointed to it with his remark 'Not how the world is, is the mystical, but that the world is'. Being. The given presence of what is. The verb that sustains all nouns and adjectives that we can think of.

How 'to let' and 'to be' are related is a constant question in living. It is one to which psychotherapists have to address themselves in every consultation. The course I started at the Westminster Pastoral Foundation on 'counselling and ontology' was an attempt to work out how this could be taught. I abandoned it, faint of heart, in the face of the seemingly irresistible attractions of the (psycho)analytic alternative.

Teaching how to let be brings us into conflict with re-minding. The crucial point is that while being-minded-of can often assist at the recognition of Being, it can also work against it. Experience with counselling and ontology has convinced me that feeling is at stake here of a kind which the (psycho)analytic schools simply do not comprehend (though perhaps what divides them does). We must try and get this feeling into the organisation of psychotherapy.

If we give ourselves over too much to re-minding we can find ourselves possessed by a spirit which knows no rest. The cultivation of memory, symbol, metaphor, imagination, becomes an addiction which cannot let be. At its best, re-minding is a call to explore all available likeness. But if we follow that call we must realise that likeness has no reason to let being rest. Likeness is restless to translate, to transform, to compare. It is impatient of the givenness of what is. It finds something defeatist in 'that is how things are. So be it'. It knows there has to be a behind and a beyond and a besides. There must be a way through or round. How things are is always open to conversion.

(Psycho)analysis has appropriated this restlessness in the presence of Being, and intends to make of it a profession. The strategy is in two stages. First, to harness this restlessness to our unknowing. This can lead in very different directions, depending on how unknowing is defined. If, with Jung, there is a tendency to identify our unknowing with the ground of Being, it can lead towards an enlargement of symbolism at the expense of Being. If, with Freud, our interest is in unknowing as denial and privation, then it leads towards what Paul Ricoeur has called a 'hermeneutics of suspicion'. All attribution of meaning is suspect. Being is left alone. Its grounding is not presumed on. (Which may come closer to true recognition of Being than the Jungian way, which sometimes seems perilously close to a collapse of ontology into symbolism.) But though the directions are different, the essential strategy is the same. Unknowing, as a kind of resourceful absence awaiting cultivation, is harnessed to our restlessness in the presence of Being. Our unknowing, our unawareness, is what carries the theoretical and practical weight. Doing and showing are of interest only in relation to states of mind, so that re-minding becomes an activity in its own right.

The second stage is to apply this activity to our own life story. A special kind of telling-about-ourselves is generated. Our ability to re-mind, and to be re-minded, is brought to bear on our partial knowledge of our story. The fact that we are ignorant of most of our story is taken as a resource. Inexhaustible ignorance of our infancy and childhood is played off against ignorance of a future which is still to be revealed. A two way dynamic, like a pulse, is set going. In drawing on ignorance-as-resource we exercise our ability to be re-minded of. And in exercising that ability we confirm the resourcefulness of unknowing. We begin to feel that we are getting inside the generation of our own story, becoming pregnant of our own cause. It is as if we get in between cause and effect in our lived story, and in gradually discovering what they have in common begin to feel the beat of a secret pulse, the pulse which causes my life to be as it is.

The result can be fascinating. It has created an absorbing profession, albeit a profession which can be quite extraordinarily rude. It can appeal to the same sense of discipline and self sacrifice as has inspired great spiritual and ethical movements. It has an effect far beyond its own borders, not least among other hermeneutic disciplines concerned with the discovering and keeping of secrets. But what does it do to our ability to let be?

Letting be can be mute resignation. It can be world weary cynicism. It can be resentment; resentment that eats into the soul, hardens the heart, exhausts the spirit and paralyses the imagination. Yet it can move from that to a position where 'making do' is possible. Make do and mend. There can be a moment of relaxation in which amendment and compromise become possible. We say, 'Oh, let it go', and a hopeless argument in which we are stuck moves into conversation and exchange. We say, 'Well, yes, I can live with that', and signify a willingness to take what is given as making a fresh start.

How is such movement possible? How is it helped and hindered by re-minding?

4

We have to think about time (always remembering that to think about time truly requires that we tread tenderly, for we are stepping on the wings of butterflies). Ontological tradition teaches us that respect for Being goes together with puzzlement about time. To understand what (psycho)analysis does to our ability to let be we have to ask how (psycho)analytic causality relates to what I have called the consistency of time (Holt 1982, 1987). Are the causes which (psycho)analysis searches out and recapitulates to be found in time, or are they also, or alternatively, of time?

I have spent much effort in the last twenty years trying to air questions about time in Jungian circles, with little response. I confess to being surprised at my failure. I would have expected a community interested in a concept like Jung's synchronicity to be more eager to enter into debate about time. I begin to suspect that (psycho)analysis as a whole may depend for its existence on a collapse of metaphysical time-questioning. Which would be a pity. Because (psycho)analytic research into sexuality, and particularly into the relation between sexuality and death, is itself calling urgently for a re-awakening of just such questioning.

The causing of time is all round us. We celebrate it in worship and prayer and festival. We drawn on it in hope. We invoke it in promise. We struggle with it between the generations, as we measure up to each others' vitality. It permeates social intercourse. It is like the sap in what sociologists call 'the social construction of reality'.

(Psycho)analytic theory is very weak on the social construction of reality. (Psycho)analytic practice is constantly trying to make good that weakness. Work in groups and families reaches out towards recognising how persons are socially constituted. Many (psycho)analysts realise that here lies the challenge, if not the crisis, of their future (see, for instance, the urgency of Isabel Menzies Lyth in her interview for *Free Associations*, No. 13, 1988).

Work of this kind would receive a great impetus if it were to allow for the social causation of time. This is indeed metaphysical, but not in some pejorative sense of inaccessible rumination. It is, as I have said, all around us. In 1985, Channel 4 Television in England carried an excellent series of programmes on its 'all around us'-ness. The Series Consultant, John Berger, wrote of the intention behind the programme:

It wasn't that we thought we knew what ought to be said. We have all discovered the trap which St Augustine described so succinctly: 'What then is time? If no one asks me, I know; but if I wish to explain it to he who asks, I know not!'

No, it wasn't that we knew what ought to be said. It was simply that, through our different experiences and lives, we had come to the conclusion that the notions about time which are embodied today in formal education, the current assumptions of news bulletins, political promises and moral sermons, are patently inadequate. What we wanted to do was to clear a space that could be given over to other, more intimate, less rhetorical and more far seeing intuitions and questions which cluster, for the most part unacknowledged, around everyone's experience of time, and then to let these intuitions talk with science and history.

To clear a space.... The organisation of psychotherapy as a profession needs such space. If we are to understand what (psycho)analysis does to our ability to let be, how it can undermine it with the concept of the unconscious and then dedicate itself scrupulously to its rediscovery, we must set it within an organisational context which does justice to the intimate and far seeing intuitions and questions which cluster around our everyday experience of time.

It helps to imagine what such a context would be like if we think of our problem with 'how many times a week?' Will it ever be possible for five times a week and once a week (psycho)analysts, and all the positions between, to talk to each other truly?

One of my most marked experiences of (psycho)analysis has been of the peculiar unease when any attempt at such talk is made. There is a strange feeling of discomfort. It is as if what we are trying to talk about is in bad taste. Value systems are being compared in a way that threatens dishonour.

I used to explain this to myself in terms of money. If people had committed themselves and others over years to a course of five times a week analysis they would have no choice but to regard once a week analysis as of inferior value. While once-a-weekers would similarly need to regard five times as wasteful. Less acutely perhaps the same would apply to the four timers and two timers. The three timers might seem to have got it just right: except that it is still a bit second best, or unnecessarily expensive, seen from other positions.

But explanations of that kind leave a lot out. They don't really seem to touch the feeling of dishonour, nor do they help in identifying the effective differences (because differences there certainly are). There are many spiritual and moral disciplines and techniques which require a seven day week commitment, and which recognise various degrees of initiation. Presumably (psycho)analysis merits comparison with these. And it is against such comparison that the various timings have to test their position.

The statutory organisation of psychotherapy will require a time-questioning context in which these various positions can prove themselves. That is one of the tasks which the Standing Conference should set itself: how to develop such a context. The social constitution of time will have to be on the agenda. So, for Jungians, would the timing of the collective unconscious. (I would want to argue that the collective unconscious is contemporary long before it gets old.)

But above all, if psychotherapy is to honour our ability to let be as well as to re-remember, the agenda will have to include argument about givenness. Our understanding of causality has to take into account our experience of gift. Causation binds us to 'keep in time'. Causation is also the gift of time 'into our keeping'. We have to be able to talk about the difference between the binding and the giving.

This difference may escape us, but it is pivotal. Letting be is hinged upon it.

The meaning of causation and the givenness of time go hand in hand. The cultivation of causality is an attempt to get hold of givenness, to make givenness work for us. But as soon as we do that, givenness is lost. That is what makes it so difficult to let be. There is a sense in which the givenness of Being repudiates causality. (I think Jung recognises that in much that he has written on synchronicity.) In searching for causes we forget givenness. We are thrown into time, and grasp after cause to keep afloat, to secure the connections by which we live. When the connections fail us we forget that it is the grasping that may be at fault. But that might also be the moment in which we are re-remembered that what binds us to keep in time may be the givenness of time itself, that what is required of us is not only the search for causes but the ability to let causation be.

How can such re-remembering coexist with the excitement of the (psycho)analytic chase, a chase in which the pursuit of causality into the heart of pain can be productive of so much meaning?

I don't believe it can if we assume that what is given is necessarily meaningful. (And here Jung's influence can mislead in ways that Freud's does not.)

(Psycho)analysis is in danger of claiming too much for meaning. Over against (psycho)analysis we need a reassertion of givenness as a category which may be meaningful or not.

Givenness has great spread. There is the givenness of religious experience in which meaning bursts upon us from the most unlikely quarters. And there is givenness of the kind we associate with the Latin words datum, data: the given facts, things as they are, discrete, separate, items to be gathered and accumulated, open perhaps to the attribution of meaning but open also to be discarded as irrelevant, as void of meaning, as just so much noise. The reassertion of givenness as against the power of meaning needs the whole spread between epiphany and data. The whole point about givenness is that it doesn't have to mean anything at all. It may, but that is neither a plus nor a minus. In terms of givenness, meaning is simply beside the point.

Many (psycho)analysts recognise the need for some such category as this. But for (psycho)analysis it remains a limit, an horizon, a privation. If we are to profess the ability to let be, to teach it, to include it within our training programmes, givenness - in all its spread from epiphany to data - has to be much more than that. It has to emerge as a field of study in its own right, a field in which performance can tell us all that needs to be told.

5

This is where our third modality comes in. Showdoing is how givenness reveals itself as indifferent to the attribution of meaning. It is an altogether different movement both of spirit and technique to the search for meaning which informs (psycho)analysis.

The most obvious characteristic of showdoing is that it gives precedence to body over mind. What is to be meant is pointed at. Demonstration precedes cognition. The example is what matters.

(Psycho)analysis has pushed all this into transference and counter-transference. If (psycho)analytic imagination and (psycho)analytic ability to get in touch with the generation of plot are to talk productively to the behavioural sciences we are going to have to unpack transference theory into a more comprehensive study of showdoing. (This may already be happening in psychotherapeutic work with groups and families.)

This unpacking can be helped if we grasp two aspects of showdoing as experienced in the theatre. One is about appearance, the other about character.

For showdoing appearance is to be made, not seen through. We make an appearance. We all know how. But that kind of know how gets forgotten in the excitement of the chase after some

reality behind appearance. Object relations theory in (psycho)analysis is trying to recover the know how. But as Jung taught us long ago in his work on extraversion and introversion, the contrast between appearance as made and appearance as to be seen through takes us into the great traditional problems of ontology. Appearance is how Being both invites and resists our participation. Theatre has always been necessary, and is today particularly urgent for psychotherapy, because it enables us to exercise and to play and to celebrate, both the invitation and the resistance. Theatre has much to contribute to the coming dialogue between (psycho)analysis and the behavioural sciences.

Our understanding of character is also affected by theatrical showdoing. In the theatre, character is to be performed. It is shown in the doing. It is made in the showing. Any inwardness it may have belongs with the audience not with the actor.

This has implications both for plots and contexts.

In performance, character is the vehicle of plot. Characters don't come first, and plots after. Plots call on character. The more familiar we are with this theatrical commonplace the easier it will be to develop connections and exchange between (psycho)analytic transference work and psychotherapy with marital and family systems.

Similarly with context. If we stay as observers, characters move within a context. But if we participate in showdoing, it is more as if context 'gives off' character. The givenness of the scene is not inert. It energises. It gives rise to. It calls forth. There is a meeting place here for (psycho)analytic object relations theory and the work on the genesis of personality being done by social constructionists like Rom Harré and John Shotter. (Holt, 1989.)

Showdoing affects us most intimately when we 'try'. Psychologists of earlier generations talked much about conation. Conation is the Latin word for trying: the familiar 'give it a try', 'can't you try harder?', 'all right, I'll have a try'. Conation is defined as 'the exertion of willing that desire or aversion shall issue in action'. We talk a lot about desire and aversion. But where are such exertion, such willing, such issuing in action, to be found in the organisation and teaching of psychotherapy?

I offer two suggestions as to where to look. First, wherever we talk of mind in terms of performance, of doing. For instance, when we say: I need time to make up my mind. Before decision can issue in action, there is a familiar process we describe as a making up. How does this compare with re-minding? There is some connection, but the modality differs. Re-minding is contemplative, reflective, associative, it scans horizons, searches in corners, returns on itself. Making up mind gathers to a point, it is intent towards conclusion. We practice it in counselling, social work, education.

The tendency for (psycho)analysis to belittle counselling as a kind of watered down version of what would be better done by itself is mistaken. Work is being done in counselling, and in

other fields where 'guidance' is not a dirty word, which shows us the mind in action. Work of this kind is what interests the cognitive psychologists, the social constructionists, the ethologists. My interest in theatre has convinced me that it is possible to relate this work on mind in action to problems of (psycho)analytic transference what I wrote above in commenting on the Laplanche-Pontalis quotation.

Second, sexuality. Certainly there is plenty of desire and aversion around here. Could showdoing help us more than it is with 'the exertion of willing' that issues in sexual action?

Again, I would recommend the idea of performance. Sexual performance in a biological sense is closely related to sexual performance in ritual and social contexts. (Psycho)analytic discovery of infantile sexuality is an essential element in its fascination. It leaves us with the problem of connecting very different kinds of performance. Infantile and adult sexual performance are not all that alike.

Many of us have broken, and have perhaps broken others, in trying to make this connection. We are helped by anything which enlarges, dilates, amplifies, our experience of performance. Certainly there is a pejorative sense in which we can say of sex: 'oh, what a performance'. More emphasis on the value of showdoing in general helps to offset such occasions with others in which the need for performance is not only privately recognised but publicly willed. Behaviour that is ridiculous, obscene, compulsive, can be transformed by performance into the kind of showing (theatrical deixis) which charges our animal skin with social significance. There can even be strange hints of religious epiphany, carrying with them the risk of divine disfigurement. Such hints are the stuff of madness when left in the mind. Performed, they are social re-minders of the power of alien cosmologies.

I would hope that (psycho)analytic interest in sexuality is now well on the way to being taken up into a wider cultural awareness of the crucial role which sexuality can play in the social construction of reality. Behavioural work being done in the field of sexual guidance seems often to be to the point in a way that personal and archetypal mythologies are not. Like mind, sex is an act. It calls for enactment. People need help in moving between rehearsal and live performance. More psychotherapeutic interest in showdoing would make it easier for us to offer that help

6

The application of Jung's work

The published emphasis of Jung's contribution to psychotherapy lies between the re-minding and the letting be. There is also a not to be underestimated contribution to the showdoing modality, for which we rely on anecdotal evidence and the tradition which has been handed on by those who worked with him.

Jung's published work emphasises questions of meaning and its articulation in the course of a person's life. This interest has been taken up into the teaching of analytical psychology. It leads

us into exploring the relationship between re-minding and letting be. The relationship is one of mutual stimulation and reciprocal limit setting.

Jung's contribution here is important, and has had an influence far beyond the bounds of psychotherapy. Some of us believe that it may mark a turning point in the history of Western culture. I don't believe we have yet assessed it properly. There is still a lot of unpacking to be done. For that it needs careful study within its historical context.

Two lines of study interest me in particular. The first is about our confusion between the two kinds of re-minding. How are the 'that re-minds me of' of memory, and the 'that re-minds me of' of symbolic activity, related? The field of argument which has opened up between developmental and archetypal approaches to Jung's work can be expected to enlarge our understanding of possible answers.

The second is perhaps more difficult. Certainly it is not so widely recognised in Jungian circles. It concerns the feeling tone of research into Being (ontology, metaphysics).

Metaphysics tends to be a dirty word for analytical psychology. Its place is taken by what at times seems to be an idolisation of psyche. Yet as Jung's work finds its place in history we shall come to recognise that it is as much about ontology as about psychology.

Clinically, this will mean study of the interdependence of empirical observation and metaphysical curiosity (curiosity which is always ticklish and often as disconcerting as the questions of children). Many of our most strongly felt disagreements belong here. To take that feeling on we will have to learn how to ask metaphysical questions. With respect to Jung, the fact that such questions do not allow of answers is no reason why they should not be asked. On the contrary it is their asking which sustains what we call scientific curiosity, a curiosity with which Jung was richly endowed.

For study of this kind it makes sense for those interested in Jung to organise themselves. But let us be clear as to what we can expect of such organisation. We have to work with the grain of the wood. Jung has not founded a self contained, self sufficient profession. In his own life he risked mixing Psyche with Being. He survived. And he left behind him a great corpus of work describing how it can be done.

This work needs to be read, researched, taught. It has more, possibly much more, to tell us about the relationship between minds and being than we have yet realised. Jung has introduced ontology and imagination to each other in many new contexts. He has familiarised us with ways of imagining that are as fragile as the wings of butterflies yet reach into the matrices of our biochemistry. His work on individuation makes it possible to relate the events of our personal lives to what used to be called The Great Chain of Being. Possibly epochal reassessments of the relationship between history and evolution will follow.

But the kind of personal and clinical difficulties we come up against in our work between re-minding and letting be, difficulties with which we need each others' help and criticism, have to be approached within a context which includes other (psycho)analytic schools. I have every sympathy with the formation of Freud-Jung groups. I enjoy the kind of interchange with Kleinians possible at the Oxford Psychotherapy Society. I have found Bion's work on groups helpful in understanding psychotic family splitting processes in Jungian groups. (Holt, 1986.) From all directions experience is pushing and jostling us towards closer association with other streams within the (psycho)analytic movement. And rightly so.

But what are the longer term goals of such closer association? Are they to develop a more powerful and cohesive (psycho)analytic profession? Or are they to allow the essential differences between Jung and Freud and others to open the (psycho)analytic enterprise into a wider field of endeavour, a field within which it would be possible for the various schools, and for (psycho)analysis as a whole, to confess their aberrations, and to seek help with our failings from outside the circle of 'those who have been analysed'?

If our intention is the former, then I agree with those Jungians who suspect that Freud-Jung groups and all that sort of thing will lead to a watering down and evasion of the difficult truths of Jung's work. (I think of Esther Harding's magisterial reply to one of the papers at the 1962 Congress of the IAAP in Zurich.) But if our intention is the latter, then I believe there is enough experience among us of living with the opposites, of tolerating the paranoid-schizoid position, of putting our wounded narcissism to work, for us to be able to take our quarrels and our deeply felt differences with us into the wider world in which re-minding and letting be are trying to accommodate each other better.

For instance, the (psycho)analytic critique of religion is not something which can be taken further from within a primarily Jungian or Freudian tradition. Study of *Answer to Job* requires study of books like René Girard's *Violence and the Sacred*. The deeplyfelt (and let it be said that the feeling involves much, much more than envy and gratitude: it involves worship and what happens when worship fails) differences within (psycho)analysis require to be exposed, in all their painfulness, to the tolerance and scepticism of religions that have lived and suffered for centuries with schism, confession, martyrdom. In the last fifty years more work has probably been done in this country within the Guild of Pastoral Psychology to further a true engagement between (psycho)analysis and religion than in any body of analytical psychology. The Guild knows about the risks of such engagement. There is a wealth of thought and feeling in its publications. Work of this kind can help us all in a more sustained reassessment of (psycho)analytic success and failure when confronted with 'the unbearable lightness of being'. But reciprocal limit setting between re-minding and letting be must include showdoing. The work of remembering and of amplification finds rest in the presence of Being when it allows for translation into action. When Being knows itself to be shown in deed the mind can be still. Distortion and failure in doing and showing are what drive us to seek help in never ending processes of re-minding. Confidence in showing and doing has to be taught alongside the researching of memory and symbol.

I guess that in Jung's own practice showdoing played a much greater part than would appear from his published works. Here the memories of those who worked with him are precious. They help us to read between the lines. How did the short term therapy he practised 'work'? Was his attitude to the transference grounded in confidence of a kind we have lost? I suspect he was at home between letting be and showdoing in a way that is more difficult for us today. Doctors of earlier times did have confidence in their hands, in what could be done and shown by touch. In reading Jung in German I have found the word *Behandlung* suggestive. Somewhere between management and treatment, it carries much of what I mean by the showdoing modality. How is it translated in the English edition? (At least twice - I have not been able to find the reference - by 'analysis'. Thus do key words acquire their semantic halo.)

But the obvious example of showdoing in Jung's work was in his interest in painting, spreading out later to include music and dance, theatre and sandplay. Many have long recognised a natural affinity between Jung's psychology and the various body therapies. Organisations like the Champernowne Trust are working well within Jungian tradition in furthering interest of this kind. All this I see as showdoing. There can be no re-minding without embodiment. The body remains, till death do us part, our most familiar acquaintance with Being.

What I hope will happen is that as we come to speak more easily of the ontological dimension to Jung's work we shall be able to contribute to new links between the body therapies and the behavioural sciences, by introducing between them a sense of imagination as act. Patients of all kinds are being encouraged to monitor the performance of their bodies, to participate more imaginatively in treatment programmes. We can enlarge the context within which this is happening by re-minding showdoing what it is like to let be.

Here I speak from my experience with theatre. There is a kind of interpretation which disables performance by claiming to see through it. This is what many of the physical therapists suspect psychotherapy of. And in many cases I think they are right. There is something in what (psycho)analysis has done to psychotherapy which is chronically envious of the deictic energy of live performance. It prefers to keep us rehearsing.

In the theatre, when we have to go on, there is another kind of interpretation waiting for us. This introduces behaviour and context to each other. It gives performance priority over anything we can say about it. The aim of interpretation of this kind is not to milk performance of its meaning but to renew its confidence in itself. It does this by marking out horizon and ground, energising density. It draws breath. It introduces what is actual to what could be, what could be to what is.

The difference between these two kinds of interpretation is crucial in the organisation of psychotherapy. Research into it should be high on the agenda of the Standing Conference.

One contribution Jungians can make to such research will be a renewed interest in *Psychological Types*. Studying interpretation in the theatre has given me a new kind of enthusiasm for Jung's distinction between extraversion and introversion. I believe it carries the potential for new research into how showdoing, re-minding and letting be, are relatable. (Indeed, at times while writing this paper I have felt that all I am trying to say is already to be found in *Psychological Types*, especially in the early editions with the Translator's Preface by H. G. Baynes. The book also needs reading in conjunction with the letters Jung exchanged with Hans Schmid-Guisan in 1915-16, unfortunately not yet published in English. These show to what extent extraversion and introversion were difficult for Jung to manage. We should not expect them to be easier for us.)

Think simply of the words subject and object as Jung uses them in *Psychological Types*. Think also of the word object as it is used in 'object relations' theory (for instance, in Winnicott's essay on The Use of an Object and Relating through Identifications). The words have a special valency. They are familiar, yet their very familiarity seems to interfere between us and what Jung is getting at. It is as if the contrast between them is being used to set up an oscillation or disturbance about what being in the world is like. A state of uncertainty is being created as to where subject and object are located, and as to which owes its being to which.

Ontology is grounded in that state of uncertainty. The questions about Being which make some kind of metaphysical reflection urgent arise within that state of uncertainty. Jung knew it well. It was his habitat. Others are determined that it does not exist, or that if it does, it is pathological, evidence of cultural immaturity or clinical inexperience.

There is a problem of 'organisation' here which is not going to go away. Feelings are at stake which cannot even be entertained without entering into lived metaphysical argument. What we make of Jung's typology depends on how far we are ourselves prepared to go in owning to connections between character or temperament and the being not only of ourselves but of the world too. If it were merely a matter of psychology, then it could perhaps be dealt with in tests and plotted on scales. But it is much more than that. It disturbs us where we are at our most edgy, shudderingly uncertain as to whether subject and object can ever be relied on to make sense together.

If analytical psychology were the whole world then it might be able to contain such uncertainty. But surely it is crazy to imagine it so. Jung's typology does not merely describe. It is closer to the I Ching than to the kind of testing done in psychological laboratories. It appeals to a ground behind the subject-object distinction. The appeal is like a launch. It launches us into Being. Or we can think of the verb to throw. Our type is how we are thrown into Being.

We can't use Jung's typology as a container. The difference between extraversion and introversion is too hazardous. We should allow it to be so. It is a way of putting ourselves at risk in the presence of (before) Being. The risk is what introduces us to givenness.

The typology is about the complexity of givenness (how much better if we had stayed with the term *Komplexe Psychologie*, still used in the German in many places, for instance in the opening sentence of *Psychology and Alchemy*). Metaphysics used to refer to it as the problem of The One and the Many. How do I remain myself in being so variable? My argument is that it helps to manage this complexity if we allow that givenness asks not only that we be mindful, but that we claim our performance rights as well.

AGENDA

The organisation of psychotherapy has to take account of the tension between private practice and public service. There is an extensive field of anxiety and embarrassment, a sense of unequal opportunity. Freedom of choice, clinical authority, and the needs of administration come into conflict. There is suspicion of what farmers call 'luxury uptake' (the excessive use of fertiliser), and of professionals who prefer prescription to negotiation. Questions of what is affordable cut across personal and clinical judgment on constantly changing frontiers between risk and security. Unpacking all that is at issue here into a workable agenda is a task for more than one generation.

More exchange between our three modalities will help get us started. To summarise my argument, here are various ways in which developments already in train could be taken further.

1. Work with transference and counter-transference can be exposed to the demonstrative energies of performance. At first this may seem to threaten entrenched positions at the heart of (psycho)analysis in a way that is unacceptable. But there may be more willingness to negotiate than seemed likely a few years ago. The mooted re-translation of Freud will help. There is more demonstrative pointing in the German words 'deuten' and 'Deutung' than in the English 'interpretation'.

2. Group therapy could experiment more with movement.

3. Body therapies could experiment with more talk about what they do.

Between movement and talk we need to be working towards more understanding of how communication and communion differ from each other while also presupposing each other. How do silence and breathing mediate between movement and word?

4. Dream interpretation should embrace the study of hermeneutics as it has developed since Freud and Jung.

5. We should continue to scan horizons and till ground common to ontology and imagination. But we must stop expecting to arrive at conclusions. To expect finality in questions of Being is to invite foreclosures of feeling. Instead, we should

6. Research our time-keeping. We have a major problem with our incongruent theories of causation. We have to open them to scrutiny from outside our profession. This will involve us in philosophical argument about time, and the feelings that go with it.

For instance, limiting ourselves to the (psycho)analytic field: feelings have been touched in our arguments about causation which have led generous men and women to despair of ever being able to talk to each other. We must not deny this. In psychotherapy, argument about causation will always overlap disturbingly with argument about absolution or forgiveness (Holt, 1988).

To open feeling of this kind to public debate we have to relate it to metaphysical argument about time. What is the order of causation between adult and child? Which comes first, and how does one affect the other? We are familiar with the hard-to-believe-in feelings of omnipotence lodged in that question. We need a frame of reference in which feelings of this kind can engage with linear, circular or alternating, random/statistical, and field, theories of causation. At present we lack such a frame of reference.

Research into the social constitution of time will help create one. Our experience of cause presupposes the social constitution of time. (Psycho)analysis has to take this into account, even if it means the disintegration of the profession. Between child and adult the social constitution of time is up for testing. Between the generations: is it a passing or is it a gap? Whichever it is, our social grounds for going on are at stake. (Oedipus and Jocasta know how they are related. But their marriage is required for the going on of the city, and that going on is given into their keeping.)

There is talk of regulating psychotherapy by Act of Parliament. If such regulation is to be helpful, it is urgent that we find ways of getting our stake in time-keeping, and the feelings that go with it, onto the agenda of our own 'parlement', the Standing Conference. The enactment of time and the enactment of law go together. That is what cause is about.

7. So we need to bring into the mainstream of our teaching programmes work which is at present widely recognised, but peripheral. For instance, there is work which touches on what Milan Kundera has named 'the unbearable lightness of being'. Over thirty years I have heard (psycho)analysts of various persuasions invoke lyric poetry in describing their methods. Lyric poetry is a familiar instance of the lightness of touch with which Being claims our attention. To teach the recognition of Being, we have to get that lightness into our training programmes (compare Cox and Theilgaard, 1987).

8. But, as Kundera reminds us in the title of his novel, that lightness can be unbearable. It belongs together with an unbearable gravity. If the feelings of absolution touched by (psycho)analytic argument about causation are to be taken up into wider political debate about time-keeping, we will have to put worship and prayer high on our agenda.

How do we bear the cost of time? In witnessing to each other what it is like to be both apprehensive of, and grateful for, its creation. Between that apprehension and that gratitude there is a whole world of feeling, ontological feeling, calling for recognition and research.

We can't bracket out religion. Religion, with all its failures, has an essential contribution to make to the organisation of psychotherapy. If we leave it out, we can busy ourselves as professionals with various strategies of displacement. But as patients our ability to let be is marginalised, uprooted from its feeling context as the time we live by is drained of our witness to its creation.

9. There is an important sense in which recognition of givenness and professional zeal are at odds. We should allow for this. It would help if we paid more attention to connections between psychotherapy and the D.I.Y. (do it yourself) factor in health care in general. I am thinking of the self motivated behaviour modification programmes of diet and exercise, of political interest in environmental health, medical initiatives to involve patients in the monitoring and management of their own treatment, of the way we and our friends and neighbours learn to live with the chronicity of illness, disablement, aging. This is where we can study how patients can, and do, become agents in making something of what is given, irrespective of whether it means anything or not. More awareness of how people respond to disease as irreversible datum is at least as important for the organisation of psychotherapy as the cultivation of meaning.

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