

# Likeness

**Seminar and Lecture notes**

**1982 and 1989**

**DAVID HOLT**

# Likeness and Difference

Notes for talk, apparently at the Westminster Pastoral Foundation, ?1982

These notes cover what may have been my first attempt to work out some ideas on likeness, in the context of comparing the “three streams” at the WPF, of individual, group, and family/marital work.

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1. Talking out of experience in supervision.

2. How I have experienced the three streams

a) Chris here at start, before me, having priority therefore

and yet: “parents” preferred individual work, group work somehow suspect

b) Impact of Helen

the acting: sculpt, role play, video - and my interest in dramatic analogies

affiliates, and their experience: Moira

witness: “Clouds of Witness”: genogram story, Dorothy Sayers!

my “blackmail model” of individual neurosis

c) How they have touched me personally

Group - navy, and boarding school

F/M - projection and the dramatic model: the world is representational

“psychoanalysis has failed to understand its own ontology”

3. How I see the problem of getting more moving between them

- ways of thinking which need to exclude each other in order to refine their own methods, define their own rigour, and perhaps above all, to be teachable

- helps to think of idea of anomaly as used by Thomas Kuhn

what Kuhn means by anomaly

how it applies here

I believe a lot of us are aware of such anomalies. They make us uneasy, anxious. This unease can make us close up, retreat into an established position, even into denial. But it can also arouse interest.

There is something very exciting around between the three streams. A sense that we could be doing it quite differently. Not only sitting down, but also standing up. A suggestion, more than a suggestion, that there may be other, different, languages waiting to be spoken. [My own.....?]

To move between our defensive unease, and our excitement, we need to play: play with ideas, with hunches, with urges. There has to be a sense of: Let's have a go.

Responsibly, carefully - but nevertheless with a sense that it's worth taking a risk.  
Not only worth: necessary.

We have to be willing to take risks. After all, we take quite a risk when we conceive a child, and where would we all be without that?

So I want to play a bit with my old favourite, the phrase make a difference.

Vive la différence!

What we do is supposed to make a difference.

Across the three streams - they all have that in common.

So what is it we do that makes a difference?

First: I note there is a verb and a noun

The verb: to make

The noun: difference

Let's play with them a bit.

## The verb

What's the making like when we set out to make a difference?

I think of three words: intervene, cause, effect

I'm going to intervene in a system of causes and effects

I'm going to get involved in a way that causes something to happen

My intervention is going to have an effect. That's what I hope.

But the something - a life, a marriage, a family - I'm going to get involved in is already an established system of causes and effects. A pretty complicated one. An unimaginably complicated one.

Or is it unimaginable? How do I imagine cause and effect in the lives of the people I see? In my own life?

Here a lot of different images come to mind. I wonder if I can get them all down.

1. A sequence of events, arranged in order of years and months and days, stretching back from now to February 9, 1926 (and beyond that - how far?), and on from then to now  
cause seems to be "thicker" at some places on that line than at others  
sometimes much thicker, as if what happened then mattered far more than what  
happened at other times  
how do these thicknesses, densities, of causal power compare?  
why is it that they seem to vary in importance from time to time as I look back?

For instance:

2. The thickness round the first few months or years on that line.

Sometimes, when I am half persuaded of the truth of the psychoanalytic vision of life, it seems as if causal power is heavily compressed and condensed right up at the beginning of that line, as if events then were much fuller, heavier, with more push, stamp, in them, more lasting power, than later events. (Seed analogy)

But if I dwell on that section of the line, a sort of forking, or separation, in my imagining of cause takes place. The line of causation which began for me then, breaks, or

jumps, into a different kind of line, to do with genetics and inheritance, and that goes back, way back, down the branching of an ancestral tree, but also into a pool, a source, a spring, randomly throwing up.

But it doesn't only break or jump backwards. It also jumps sideways, My line of causation is only one thread - it begins in a web of other lines of causation already there.

Story of when my first child was born.....

To do justice to that, I have to think not only of a web, but of a sort of fluid, matrix, a fluid conductor.

Take the word impingement: it isn't only a question of what causes impinge on the child. What is impinging on the parents, on the grown ups, looking after the child?

Some of these can be thought of as discrete events affecting us; others can only be thought of as a constellation, an impingement of influences which are distributed unevenly through a sort of fluid matrix in which the social, historical, biological events are confusedly jostling each other, a sort of noise to use the cybernetic term.

How does the "noise" of an unproductive jostling compare with the "mix", when we, or fate, gets the mixture right, and events "set" nicely thank you very much?

But there are other pictures that come to mind when I try to imagine the causes which have affected my life.

3. Some like a violent blow, a bolt from the blue. Accidents that suddenly alter everything.

[July 4, 1958]

the break in the thread, in the connexity of sequence

but also, the re-constitution of the field within which connexity unfolds.

4. How does the "bolt from the blue" kind of cause relate to the "piling one small bit on top of another" kind of cause which goes into learning, into building up of habit?

5. And then, as something which can appear as a kind of opposite to accident, yet can also seem strangely akin to accident: choice.

choice as causative:

careful, deliberate choice, weighing up the pros and cons, taking advice, choice solemnised in the most formal affirmation that I know what I am doing -

and yet, when we look back at the beginnings of what F/M work calls our “family of choice”, wasn’t it all really pretty accidental when you come right down to it?

And yet, again a yet: choice does make a difference, does cause change, and if we have chosen so to say freely we feel responsible for the difference making in a way which we don’t for accident.

6. And then there’s a very different kind of cause - attraction.

a) If we are thinking in terms of line, of sequence, growth, development, attraction is ahead: goal or purpose as cause, teleology

as we grow older, it seems to matter more and more whether we can imagine death as a cause, as an end, which draws life to its close, so that

as the end looms up ever more insistently, the same sort of thickness and density of causal power which can inform the beginnings of my life gathers round the presence of death

causal power which I have understood in terms of growth and development, or accident, or choice, like sex for instance, redefine themselves from inside themselves as it were, revealing that their purpose was somewhat other to what I had imagined.

b) If we are thinking in terms of field, of matrix, then attraction is across a space. Particles rearrange themselves. I push through a jostling crowd to a face that attracts me on the other side of the room. An event, an idea, a person, acts as a catalyst. There’s a lot of chemistry around. Persons have an effect which is magnetic. Music as well as architecture or sculpting determine where I fit into the system.

That’s enough on the verb, the making a difference. Let’s look now at the noun: difference.

## The noun

It helps to start from client's point of view. The client's way into 'difference' isn't through making: it's through telling - Yes, I can tell there's a difference.

There's a word play worth noting: telling a difference, and a telling difference.

Telling a difference as recognition, and a telling difference as effective.

I think that play on the word 'telling' is worth bearing in mind, if we want to move between the client's point of view and our own.

How do we tell a difference? How does a difference tell?

We compare. We compare likeness and unlikeness. We can't tell a difference unless we can also tell a likeness. Differences tell because likenesses tell.

I think the reciprocity between difference and likeness is crucial if we are to use the togetherness of the three streams in the WPF to stimulate fresh thinking. Because I believe one of the most valuable things that has been happening at the WPF over the last ten years is that we have been learning to move more surely and effectively between two kinds of telling a difference, two ways of allowing difference to tell.

One is contemplative, reflective. The other is performative. Both involve us in comparing likeness and unlikeness.

Think of the moments in our work which make a difference. Isn't there always tell of likeness? Some "Oh, it's a bit like....", or "Oh, so it's like that, is it?", or "Oh, so you see it like that, do you?", or "Good gracious, do I look like that?"

This likeness can be temporal or spatial. The likeness which tells is between past and present. Psychoanalysis contributes hugely to the power of imagination in reminding us how adult and childhood experience are like each other, and therefore different: different and therefore like.

Try it on your own therapy with the question: am I the same person who was two, five, ten, fifteen years old? Watch how the idea of sameness breaks out into a whole field of likenesses and differences.

But likeness can also be spatial: a comparing what is here, and there, now, so that likeness is presented in front of us, beside us, behind us, in performance, in behaviour. Role play is an obvious example of this. So are some kinds of transference interpretation. And I wonder how much of what seems to me to be the muted enactment of group work isn't made up of such spatial likeness.

There is likeness which reminds us, reflectively, privately. And there is likeness which calls us to re-present, publicly, in performance. I believe the mixing between our three streams has shown how much can be done in ringing the changes between likeness and difference. To take it further we need to get what I've been calling the noun and the verb together.

### **How the noun and the verb come together**

How does telling a difference, in the sense of recognising, seeing, become so telling, in the sense of having an effect, as to make a difference?

I find the answer through the word metaphor.

How different the history of psychoanalysis would have been if the English had translated the German Übertragung with the Greek metaphor rather than the Latin transference.

Metaphor is much more than a figure of speech. Metaphor derives its power from the way language, as a system, enters into all the ramifications and interstices of the complex system known to some of us as the social construction of reality.

Metaphor is the becoming causal of likeness.

Metaphor, which both recognises and establishes likeness, affects us in the way it does

- because
- a) language is social
  - b) reality is made up socially.

Likeness becomes causal. That's how the verb and the noun come together when we make a difference. That's what we need to be studying if we want to bring some order into the multiplicity and confusion of our causal models: the metaphoric connections, and there are many of them, between likeness and causation



Family is one such link. All likeness was originally conceived as kinship, a fact still marked in linguistic usage by the words 'genus', 'genre', 'kind', to designate any sort of class. So was causation.

Our first ideas on causation evolved within a field of things and events - our modern distinction between the two was not made - believed to be 'akin'. The members of a kinship group are en rapport with one another. They act and react on one another in a special way.

This is the source of one of the earliest theories of causality, that "like can only act on like". When we do our genograms we remember this source. But behind and within genogram there is more than family. The crisscross of affinity and consanguinity permeates the social construction of reality. It is one of the causes of society. It also generates metaphor.

For example, see André Green's analysis of the Oedipus complex in his book *The Tragic Effect* (in French: *An Eye too Many*). In the tension between family and society the power of metaphor operates as much within adult reflection on language, sexuality, the division of labour, property, the processes of manufacture (from kitchen to factory), as within the projective identifications of infancy.

I think those who have felt the tug and attraction of the three rival streams at the WPF are well placed to explore further this wide field of metaphoric tension between family, society, and individual.

Two years ago, some of us spent a weekend working on this. We called it "Discovery and Invention in Family Life", and took Ibsen's play *The Wild Duck* as our text. We worked in three groups to explore the family secrets round which the play is constructed. At the end, we presented three sculptures of how we had come to experience those secrets.

I'd like to take such work further, as a more sustained and planned exploration of metaphor as both verb and noun. And I would particularly like to involve people trained in the hermetics of group work, who want to try what it's like to get up out of their chairs and do it, as the wind surfers say, standing up. Because if we are to move more freely between

family secret, which both binds and generates, and the causal conditioning of everything we mean by the social contract or the social construction of reality, I am sure we need the intimacy of groups.

The intimacy of groups. But it's not simply intimacy. It's a contrived intimacy between strangers.

As I have worked on what to say this evening this sense of what can be discovered, and invented, within a field of contrived intimacy between strangers has kept coming to mind.

Groups contrive an intimacy between strangers in which metaphoric tension can spark in ways which are different to when one and one shut themselves up in a room together. And I wonder whether this contrived intimacy between strangers isn't raising questions about the place of marriage and family in society which will insist on being taken further, perhaps much further, than we can yet imagine.

Family is really a very peculiar affair.

As a causal system, it's a scandalous contradiction. On the one hand, all that apparently free choice we put into getting married. On the other, the blatant determinism of being born. Psychoanalysis helps in reminding us just how difficult it is to imagine what that contradiction is like. But I do ask myself whether in the contrived intimacy between strangers which we enjoy and suffer in groups there may be more opportunities to re-imagine both marriage and family than we yet realise.

Further work on the lines we started on two years ago would be a good way of finding out.

# Guilt and Likeness

notes for talk at IGAP, February 1989

(These notes were handwritten, including the quotations. I have copied these from my notes, and have not checked them with the original.)

## Shape of talk

1. Title - how they are connected

“witness” will be involved

2. Where does the talk come from?

various previous attempts to talk on likeness: papers on

Mood, Plot and Parabolic Imagination 1982

Sex and the Wound of Time 1983 (‘seeming’ in *The Winter’s Tale*)

Psychoanalysis and Witness 1985

Making an Appearance: the Hazard of Being a Person 1988

but main source is the dream of Question of Taste, from January 1957

tell the dream

(so one function of this talk may be to show how a dream can go on working,  
and being worked on, over decades)

3. Overall theme

the way in which questions of responsibility involve questions of likeness  
explain

4. Dreams of Guilt and Witness

aim of this section: to bring out two senses of “responsible”

fault, blame AND able to respond

5. Likeness

Golding, Langer

cp Jung’s use of Lévy Bruhl’s *participation mystique*

aim: excitement, awe, fearful implications of - likeness

6. How are likeness and guilt connected?

## **The dream**

An utter horror. In a sense I come in at the end and it is all to be enacted, a horrible and loathsome play which brings us to an end, a consummation of horror that is hardly redeemed by the fact that it is 'only' a play.

I am asked to join another 3 in putting on this play. I accept. It is long, and there are infinite sweatings, and dreads, and tortures, and horrors. One of our number is blind, a huge guzzling beast, who yet leads us since much here depends on an instinctive sense of touch and on a blind man's uncanny sense of hearing. We are returning to a centre, which is the house of a power that has wronged us intolerably, and at the same time the home in which we have suffered all these ills. We know that He is now virtually alone, but we fear death by his hand. In the house is a room, a cell, where for years within moments I have spent unending nights of loneliness and nightmare dread.

But when we enter the house, He is finished. I see my blind and so sane companion guzzling a great meal, while in the hall I see in a huge fire over half the hall spreading up to the rafters the roasting End of Him and his lackeys - they are being consumed in flames and he himself is turning like a huge spit in agony. I call out to Him, to ask what it all really is, and He explains Himself as 'Jacobean', and points to a roasting (human) trunk beside him and says "That is a Jacobean trolley". I turn away in final exhausted horror and say to one of our Four, as explanation and summary of the whole affair: "It is all a Question of Taste".

Who wrote it, I ask? They explain it is their (Young Conservative association) courageous adaptation into contemporary English of a bitter French play/film/poem written some time ago, perhaps 150 years ago, violently attacking the whole standard and categories of Jacobean/Jacobin taste - in art, furniture, etc.

## **Susanne K. Langer's book "Mind: an Essay on Human Feeling"**

This book, published in 1967 at the end of her career, was a main source of the ideas developed in my talk.

This quotation, from the Introduction, page xvii, summarised it as

"The main task entailed by the undertaking of a new attack on the problem of mind in the context of natural history, without resort to metaphysical assumptions of non-zoological factors for the explanation of man's estate, is to keep the biological concept adequate to the greatness of the reality it is supposed to make comprehensible".

Her answer:   Feeling and Form  
                  Feeling for Form  
                  Rhythm  
                  Act  
                  are brought to bear on the story of evolution.

## Overall theme

The way in which questions of responsibility involve questions about likeness:

what happened?

who did it?

whose fault was it?

all imply the question: what was the event in question 'like'?

Think of the reply: "It wasn't like that at all"

when there's an argument as to who was to blame

The reconstruction of events, ascertaining the facts, involves us in some kind of comparison.

To get at the inwardness as well as the outwardness of what happens we have to liken, to compare, to contrast.

Any event has likeness built into it.

"It wasn't like that"

"I'm not like that"

"The world's like that"

## Typical dreams of Guilt and Witness

two sides of the crime: victim - police as protection

agent - police as pursuer

two sides of the chase: sometimes the quarry

sometimes the investigator

doubts about the aim of the pursuit/investigation: vengeance

punishment

how does punishment differ from vengeance?

So between vengeance and punishment, finding out what really happened

this is where the witness comes in

we get dreams in which the idea of punishment and execution changes into the idea of having to appear in court and to answer for oneself

So the sense of guilt is turning into a sense of being called or summoned to take responsibility, to bear witness to your own actions

the two senses of "owning"

## Witness as third party

Agent, Victim, Witness

Witness is implicated in the action. This can develop in various directions.

1. Guilt if one passes by on the other side of the street
2. Danger of becoming a victim oneself if the criminal realises you have seen
3. More general example of this: if you come forward as a witness you can become a martyr
4. OR: in a different direction altogether, witness can become a blackmailer  
(that is, instead of becoming assimilated to the victim, the witness moves into the position of agent, and the original agent becomes the victim)
5. OR: moving on into investigation and being taken into court, think what happens if you give your name as a witness after a road accident:  
“what did you see?”: whether your evidence is wanted or not will depend on your answer  
which leads on into
6. Witness in Court, between prosecution, defence, jury, judge  
is the function of witness
  - a) to help get a conviction
  - b) to help get an acquittal
  - c) to help society find out what really happened so that it can be taken into our understanding of ‘case’ law, into our understanding of what human nature and society are really like?

## How are Likeness and Guilt related?

1. Locate what I am saying in more familiar approaches: Jung’s use of Lévy Bruhl’s *participation mystique*, and the whole magic-religion-science debate
2. Fearfulness of likeness  
Draw on general effect of the Langer quotes to make this point  
Likeness works on a continuum from comfort to reassurance to wonder to awe to terror in reminding us of the Other: the brother, the stranger, the alien  
There is something here of the link between witness and martyr. It works thus:  
likeness implicates us in the resemblance of things: it makes us responsible for holding onto, and managing, a middle position between Sameness and Difference  
it is as if we are the conductor through which Sameness and Difference discharge into each other  
What happens if we cannot manage that discharge?  
Or: how do we manage that discharge, that transference of Being as between the Same and the Different?  
Three ways: story, cause, idolatry

## Story

Go back to Langer quote (from p.284, Volume II), on relation between image and “virtual history” in dreams

how this discharge is managed in dreams  
there is a showing forth, and a telling  
to realise what is being shown forth, we have to tell it  
what is given is a picture, an image  
to respond to it, to do something about it, we have to get it into a story

But there is always a sense in which what is shown forth eludes the telling, and the telling is always admitted to being of something which remains other

Until a circuit is broken: until something circular becomes the spark-across between two poles

That is the gap between Lok and Homo Sapiens (Golding’s *The Inheritors* - see **Postscript**)  
The great evolutionary leap, which is the development of the modern individual we take for granted, is when we are able to use the telling aspect of likeness in isolation from its showing forthness

But in the breaking of that circuit not only is likeness made available to us as an instrument: guilt is also made available as an expression of our being in the world.

## Cause

Early Greek thought - the connection between  
Retribution and Punishment  
Cause and Effect.

Lengthy quotes were circulated from Hans Kelsen’s *Society and Nature* 1946.  
These dealt with the whole idea of retribution in primitive then in early Greek thought.

### In relation to arche, source:

P.235 “Only when things originate from the same source do they have the same nature, and only like things can react on one another: that is, only things alike in a specific sense can help or injure one another. That like things can influence only like things is an idea which can be found in different variations throughout the Greek philosophy of nature....

“The idea that only like things can affect like things may still be found among the Atomists, who detached the principle of causality from its mythological origins. This thesis that only like can affect like, that the cause must be equal to the effect (in which form this idea subsisted in 19th century physics), clearly had its origin in the principle of retribution. Here is its proper sense, here alone there is a maintainable meaning: that between punishment and wrong,

between reward and merit, exists a sort of equality. This equality is primarily qualitative, since evil entails evil, and good entails good, since the evil of wrong is connected with the evil of punishment and the good of merit with the good of reward”.

p.237, on Anaximander, fragment 1:

“ ‘And into that from which things take their rise, they pass away once more, as is meet, for they make reparation and satisfaction to one another for their injustice according to the ordering of time’. Here, for the first time in the thinking of mankind, the notion of an immanent law governing the whole universe is comprehended. It is the earliest statement of the law of causality. But, even though generalised, it is still essentially the law of retribution. Chronologically, the cause, as the wrong, must precede the effect, as the punishment. Just as necessity is the compulsion of the legal rule of retribution, so is the chronological order, the earlier and the later, the sequence of wrong and punishment. In this dynamic of retribution, scientific thought for the first time realises the time category. The reason why modern science still characterises the relationship of cause and effect as asymmetrical and still maintains that the cause must precede the effect in time is that the cause was originally the wrong and the effect the punishment”.

pp.241-2, on Empedocles.

Note how the idea of transmigration of the soul makes for sense of universal kinship (likeness), and

Love which binds together, binds = same = ONE

Strife which separates, isolates = difference = MANY

(Fragment 17, Diels)

pp.247-8, on Cause in the Atomists

also linked to “likeness” (and, at one remove, still with idea of suffering).

Quoting Diogenes Laertes(?) on Leucippus’ theory:

“The world comes into being thus. There were borne along by ‘abscission from the infinite’ many bodies of all sorts of figures ‘into a mighty void’, and they being gathered together produce a single vortex. In it, as they came into collision with one another and were whirled round in all manner of ways, those which were alike were separated apart and came to their likes”

Hans Kelsen comments:

“The decisive facts are the collision and separation, the blows and counterblows, of the atoms.

It is in these facts that  $\alpha\nu\tau\alpha\kappa\epsilon$ , the necessity which we call ‘causality’, manifests itself. This signifies that the atomists saw causality in a phenomenon the scheme of which is action and reaction. This idea is similar to the principle of retribution, which connects an action with its specific reaction, the wrong with the punishment, the merit with the reward.



p.248, on αἰτία

“When, in Democritus as well as elsewhere in the old philosophy of nature, ‘cause’ means ‘αἰτία’, then one must not forget that this word’s original meaning was ‘guilt’ The cause is ‘responsible’ for the effect. This is the internal connection between the elements of the law of causality; and the idea of such an internal connection between cause and effect has not yet entirely disappeared from the thinking of modern natural science”.

and in footnote on P.379

“The word αἰτία, which appears for the first time in Pindar and Aeschylus, means ‘guilt’ here. But in Herodotus’ prologue to his history it signifies ‘cause’. In Homer, the substantive, aitia, does not appear, but the adjective, aitiōs, and the verb, aitiaōmai, are found; the former means ‘guilty’, the latter ‘to accuse’, ‘to charge’. The word is possibly related to the old Indian word *ainas*, which means sacrilege, sin, guilt.....Werner Jaeger.....writes that the Greek notion ‘of Cause (αἰτία) was originally the same as the idea of Responsibility, and was transferred from legal to physical terminology’ ”.

## **Idolatry**

Hadn’t meant to include this theme, but the book by Salman Rushdie and Muslim outrage persuaded me

How is likeness related to the holy?

Jung makes much of “the idea of the holy”, but does he draw out all its implications?

Reading Owen Barfield 1957-1958

Barfield becoming known in Jungian circles since  
friend of C S Lewis

*Poetic Diction* in late 1920’s

Then *Saving the Appearances: a Study in Idolatry* in 1957

Its effect on me: Barfield is talking about the same thing as Jung’s work on symbolism, but insisting on some kind of gulf implicit in the reality of what I’ve called “the broken circuit” - a gulf which seemed to me to be in danger of collapse in the psychology of the (collective) unconscious.

In terms of likeness, what I got from Barfield:

- a) likeness is given into our keeping
- b) in being made responsible for likeness we are given more power than we know what to do with
- c) if we aren't to abuse that power, we have to recognise that 'likeness' (if it is not to collapse into 'sameness') requires that 'difference' be grounded in an Otherness which is so absolutely Other that it cannot be thought of as 'like' anything at all
- d) that Otherness is what the Holy is about
- e) so, to put it in another way: if likeness gets divorced from holiness, then we are in trouble
- f) it's called idolatry

Do we perhaps live in a culture which has forgotten how the wholly Other affects us?  
In which case, what does that do for our experience of likeness?

## **Conclusion**

We are guilty about likeness  
A sense if you like of 'original sin'  
Likeness extends us beyond our natural ability.  
To respond to it we have to seek out judgment.  
But judgment requires likeness for its proof.

In terms of my dream:

taste calls for judgment  
taste aspires to be judged  
for its own satisfaction taste seeks to incorporate judgment  
but judgment in its turn calls for taste  
judgment depends on taste as its witness  
judgment is interested in what the world is like  
to arrive at the likeness it requires taste

Time

## Postscript (added 2001) - the hunger that food would not satisfy

Nowhere that I know of is the power of likeness caught so well as in a famous passage in William Golding's novel *The Inheritors*. The book tells the story of a group of protohuman beings as they return to their summer food gathering lands and are disturbed by the presence of another group with powers strangely different from theirs, a group of beings whom we call homo sapiens.

The story is told through the experience of one member of the protohumans group - Lok. Here is Golding's evocation of the transitory moment in which Lok discovers, and then loses, "likeness".

The noise of the people diminished a little until he could hear no more than the voice of the old man when it rose in command or fury. Down here where the forest changed to marsh and the sky opened over bushes, straggling willow and water, there was no other sign of their passage. The woodpigeons talked, preoccupied with their mating; nothing was changed, not even the great bough where a red-haired child had swung and laughed. All things profited and thrived in a warm windlessness. Lok got to his feet and wandered along by the marshes towards the mere where Fa had disappeared. To be Mal was proud and heavy. The new head knew that certain things were gone and done with like a wave of the sea. It knew that the misery must be embraced painfully as a man might hug thorns to him and it sought to comprehend the new people from whom all changes came.

Lok discovered "Like". He had used likeness all his life without being aware of it. Fungi on a tree were ears, the word was the same but acquired a distinction by circumstances that could never apply to the sensitive things on the side of his head. Now, in a convulsion of the understanding Lok found himself using likeness as a tool as surely as ever he had used a stone to hack at sticks or meat. Likeness could grasp the white-faced hunters with a hand, could put them into the world where they were thinkable and not a random and unrelated irruption.

He was picturing the hunters who went out with bent sticks in skill and malice.

"The people are like a famished wolf in the hollow of a tree".

He thought of the fat woman defending the new one from the old man, thought of her laughter, of men working at a single load and grinning at each other.

"The people are like honey trickling from a crevice in the rock".

He thought of Tanakil playing, her clever fingers, her laughter, and her stick.

"The people are like honey in the round stones, the new honey that smells of dead things and fire".

They had emptied the gap of its people with little more than a turn of their hands.

"They are like the river and the fall, they are a people of the fall; nothing stands against them".

He thought of their patience, of the broad man Tuam creating a stage out of coloured earth.

"They are like Oa".

There came a confusion in his head, a darkness; and then he was Lok again, wandering aimlessly by the marshes and the hunger that food would not satisfy was back.